Beacon In The Dark

Sydney Morning Herald

Saturday February 24, 2007

Reviewed by Robert Hill Robert Hill is Australia's ambassador to the United Nations.

Kofi Annan: a man of peace in a world of war

By Stanley Meisler

John Wiley, 358pp, $44.95

Kofi Annan had a near impossible job as UN secretary-general but he never lost his resolve despite the world body's failures.

WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL is regarded by some as the closest thing the world has had to a secular pope, it's not surprising that a great deal will be written about him. Therefore, with his recent retirement as secretary-general of the United Nations, we are now facing a proliferation of books on the life, character and record of Kofi Annan.

The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the era of American power by James Traub was the first released. In his critical and thoroughly informed analysis, Traub, who writes for The New York Times Magazine, focused on the contest of power and the toll it took on Annan's health and standing. Another book, soon to be released, is Secretary or General?: the UN secretary-general in world politics, edited by Australian scholar Simon Chesterman.

It was, however, the unauthorised biography by Stanley Meisler, a former foreign and diplomatic correspondent of the Los Angeles Times and a prolific writer on UN affairs, that I read on a recent flight to Khartoum in Sudan. It was an interesting coincidence as one of Annan's last efforts as secretary-general was to visit Khartoum, continuing to encourage the parties towards a settlement of the Darfur crisis. The situation there also highlights, Meisler argues, one of the conundrums of being secretary-general.

The peace agreement between northern and southern Sudan, negotiated during Annan's tenure, ended a civil war that lasted decades and cost more than 2 million lives. Yet Annan received little credit. In the west of Sudan, however, the Darfur conflict drags on, again with a huge toll in death and misery, and this is listed by some commentators as one of Annan's failures.

Thus, when victory is achieved, credit goes to member states, while failure rests with the UN. This makes for tough justice for any secretary-general but particularly for an insider.

Annan was the first insider to be appointed secretary-general and he was personally marked by the UN's previous failures.

One such experience was Rwanda in 1994, when the UN and the international community were unable to stop the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children. Annan, as under-secretary-general for peacekeeping, had to accept at least partial responsibility for this.

A second was in Bosnia. Again, Annan was head of peacekeeping. The massacre of prisoners at Srebrenica was in some ways a worse experience for the UN, in that the decision to disarm the Muslims in order to be able to protect them could be said to have contributed to their deaths.

This may not have been Annan's call and, as with Rwanda, the force and mandate provided by member states was grossly inadequate, but it was nevertheless a terrible failure.

Meisler argues that Annan's third learning experience was Somalia. He was again the peacekeeping chief when the situation exploded and the Americans led an understandable withdrawal. Innocent Somalis were left to fend for themselves and suffered greatly, teaching Annan the limits of UN power.

The author identifies qualities in Annan that are often overlooked. Beyond the warmth, charm and dignity is a deep sense of mission and personal resolve. Meisler sees this perspective more than Traub and argues that the tragedies of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia reinforced Annan's determination and sense of justice.

It is true that Annan saw himself as much more than the UN's chief administrative officer. He saw himself as representing not states but "the peoples" of the world, with a "sacred duty" to do whatever possible to prevent war and conflict. This job description was not necessarily shared by member states of the UN and it got him into trouble. He clashed with the US over its decision to bomb Serbia and, famously, over Iraq. He believed that with further perseverance a peaceful resolution might have been achieved and, if not, a specific Security Council resolution authorising collective action should have preceded an attack.

Yet, ironically, Annan understood better than most that for the UN to function effectively it needed the support of the Americans, particularly in what he saw as the great challenge of our time - that of protecting the individual person from gross abuse by the state.

Meisler has painted Annan as a leader with moral authority but no army, a man who sought to influence world affairs for the better but faced impossible hurdles and received less than fair credit for his efforts. Like Traub's biography (also unauthorised), it is ultimately sympathetic and, again like Traub, Meisler writes with the knowledge and confidence of one well versed in the UN system - in fact, as one who is a part of the UN community. It's Meisler, though, who delves deeper into Annan's early years in Ghana and his struggle to succeed in the American school system, both of which had such an impact on the course of his life.

This study provides a fascinating insight into an important and complex individual in a period of tumultuous change.

© 2007 Sydney Morning Herald

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